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SocidtJ Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale
v. United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa: The Supreme
Court of. the United States Adopts a
Case-by-Case Standard in Applying the
Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad.
In Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale (Aerospatiale),, the
Supreme Court-of the United States for the first time took occasion
to interpret the multilateral Hague Evidence Convention2 treaty v.is-
&-vis the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules).3 The
Supreme Court has not interpreted an international treaty since 1985. 4
In addition, Aerospatiale may be the first attempt by the Supreme
Court to resolve a conflict between any international treaty and
American federal legislation.
I. Soci/t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for the So.
Dist. of Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) [hereinafter Aerospatiale].
2. Hague Evidence Convention, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444,
847 U.N.T.S. 231 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (Supp. 1987)) [hereinafter Hague Evidence
Convention]. See infra notes 5-18 and accompanying text (outlining the treaty's background
and provisions).
3. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure serve as the procedural rules governing all
actions brought in United States federal district courts. Pursuant to authority granted by
Congress in 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court has promulgated these rules as originally enacted
and as amended. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Notes
of the Advisory Committee, Law Review Commentaries, and the judicial constructions of the
Rules, are published at the end of Title 28.
4. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985) (holding an international air carrier not liable
under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention).
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 1
Aerospatiale gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to provide a
resolution to conflicts over which procedures and methods litigants
in American courts should use to secure evidence from abroad. Given
the differences which exist between common law and civil law legal
systems, as will be discussed, problems inevitably arise when evidence
sought in American lawsuits is physically located in a foreign sov-
ereign's territory. The Hague Evidence Convention resulted from a
desire to accommodate the competing interests of the signatory
nations. 5 In Aerospatiale, the Supreme Court provided its view as to
the extent to which the treaty's drafters achieved their goal.
I. Ta HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
Treaty delegates to the Hague Evidence Convention adopted a final
draft as a result of the 11th Session's comprehensive revision of the
1954 Hague Convention Chapter II rules governing letters rogatory
and the taking of evidence in foreign countries. 6 The U.S. Senate
gave its advice and consent on February 1, 1972. 7 The Hague Evidence
Convention became effective in the United States as positive law on
October 7, 1972. 8 France joined as a signatory to the treaty on
October 6, 1974.9
The Hague Evidence Convention establishes three avenues by which
to obtain evidence located in foreign countries:
5. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2549.
6. Amram, United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad, 67 Am. J. INT'L L. 104, 105 (1973). Philip W. Amram represented the United States
at the Convention, was appointed rapporteur of the Special Commission and co-chaired the
drafting committee. Report of the United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague
Conference on Private International Law, 8 INTL'L LEcAAL MAATnis 785, 805 (1969) [hereinafter
Report of the U.S. Delegation]. As "rapporteur" (reporter), Amram prepared the Conference's
official report on the Hague Evidence Convention. The Secretary of State's Letter of Submittal
to the President (1972), reprinted in 12 INT'L LE AL. M&TErPAxS 323, 326 (1973) [hereinafter
Letter of Submittal].
7. 118 CONG. REc. 20623 (1972). Many legal organizations expressed support for ratifi-
cation of the Convention, including: the Judicial Conference of the United States; the American
Bar Association (at its 1969 Annual meeting, passing a resolution to that effect); the Consular
Law Society, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and several
local American bar associations. Letter of Submittal, supra note 6, at 326 (cited in Aerospatiale,
supra note 1, at 2549).
8. 8 MAWrtAT E-HuDBBL, LAW DnEcroaY (pt. 7), i3, 15 (1987) [hereinafter MARTIN-
DAI.E-HuBBEnl.
9. Boyd & Borel, Opportunity for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence from France for
Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 I,-r'L LAw. 35, 36 (1979) [hereinafter Boyd]. The
Hague Evidence Convention is currently in force in 20 signatory countries: Argentina, Barbados,
Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel,
Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom, and United States. MARTm1oAr.x-HUBBELL, supra note 8, at 15.
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1. Letters of Request;10
2. Commissioners;" and
3. Diplomatic, or consular officials.' 2
The most controversial provisions to date, and to which United States
courts have directed most attention, are Articles 23 and 27, which
allow signatory countries to declare their own exceptions to the Hague
Evidence Convention procedures. Article 23 permits a signatory to
refuse to issue letters of request for purposes of obtaining "common
law-style" pretrial discovery. 13 Article 27 allows signatories, subject
to international agreements, to permit by internal law or practice,
alternative methods of obtaining evidence. 14
II. COmPAISON OF THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION AND THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Both the Hague .vidence Convention and the Federal Rules pro-
vide for issuance of letters of request. The Federal Rules call them
"letters rogatory". 15 This method has become a primary means of
obtaining foreign evidence from recalcitrant witnesses.'6
The Hague Evidence Convention is the first multilateral agreement
to codify methods for taking evidence via commissioners.17 By way
of declaration, the individual signatory nations may limit use of
commissioners to a."prior permission" requirement. 18
The Hague Evidence Convention, however, does not provide for
the taking of evidence by an officer of the signatory nation where
10. MARMI)ALM-HUBBEIL, supra note 8, pts. 13-14.
11. Id. pt. 14.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see infra note 67 (text of Article 23).
14. Id.; see infra note 68 (text of Article 27).
15. Fai. R. Civ. P. 28(b). A letter rogatory is: "A formal communication in writing,
sent by a court in which an action is pending to a court or judge of a foreign country,
requesting that the testimony of a witness resident within the jurisdiction of the.latter court
may be there formally taken and transmitted to the first court for use in the pending action."
BLAcK's LAw DicTiONARY 815 (5th ed. 1979). See generally Comment, The Hague Evidence
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. A Comparison
with Federal Rules Procedures, 7 BRooxLyI J. hW'L L. 366 (1981) (describing function of
letters rogatory).
16. Comment, supra note 15, at 384, n.82. But see Hague Evidence Convention, arts. 12,
23 (In its declarations made pursuant to these articles, France has declared it will refuse to
issue Letters of Request for pretrial discovery "common law-style").
17. Id. at 381. Commissioners are persons appointed by the court of the state where the
action is pending, and before whom depositions can be taken in a foreign country. Report of
the U.S. Delegation, supra note 6, at 806. See also FED. R. Crv. P. 28(b)(2) (providing for
depositions to be taken outside of U.S. for use in U.S. cases).
18. Comment, supra note 15, at 382.
369
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the evidence is located. Because consular and diplomatic officials in
most civil law signatory countries already have authority to obtain
evidence,19 to so provide in the treaty would be superfluous. As
amended, the Federal Rules, however, authorize consular officials in
the country in which depositions are to be taken to administer oaths.20
Thus, in at least one respect, the Federal Rules honor foreign judicial
sovereignty.2'
III. COMMON LAW VERsus CIvI: LAW APPROACHES TO OBTAINING
EVIDEINCE IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
The significance of the .various procedures becomes apparent upon
examination of the differences between common law and civil law
approaches to the discovery of trial evidence. Evidence sought through
discovery methods in the United States (a common law country), for
example, need not be admissible at trial, so long as "the information
sought appears reasonably to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." 22 The wide scope afforded American discovery, however,
has been described by foreign tribunals as allowing "fishing pro-
ceedings."23
In contrast, most civil law countries put discovery oversight in the
hands of judges. For example, France "reject[s] the suggestion that
such a critical function of the court be entrusted to the parties
themselves." 2 Moreover, many countries, including France, have
reacted to the broad United States discovery efforts by enacting
"blocking statutes" 25 to impose criminal as well as civil penalties
upon citizens who allow the removal of evidence from the country. 26
These statutes "are designed to take advantage of the foreign gov-
emnment compulsion defense.., by prohibiting the disclosure, cop-
19. Id. at 375.
20. Id. at 374-75; FED. R. Crv. P. 28(b)(I).
21. Comment, supra note 15, at 374-75.
22. F D. R. Cirv. P. 28(b)(1).
23. Radio Corporation of America v. Rauland Corporation, [1956] 1 Q.B. 618, 649
(C.A.). See also Boyd, supra note 9, at 35-36; Carter, Existing Rules and Procedures, 13 INT'L
LAw. 5, 5 (1979).
24. Comment, Strict Enforcement of Extraterritorial Discovery, 38 STAN. L. Rav. 841-46
(1986). See also Boyd, supra note 9, at 35-36.
25. See F.T.C. v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Point-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1326 n.
145 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (description of types of blocking statutes).
26. See Batista, Confronting Foreign "Blocking" Legislation: A Guide to Securing Dis-
closure from Non-resident Parties to American Litigation, 17 INTr' LAw. 61, 62 (1983);
RESrATEmENT oP FOREIN RE ATONS LAW op TnE UNrTED STATES (REmED) § 437 reporter's
note 4 (Tent. Draft. No. 7, 1986) [hereinafter RESTATEmENT (REwVsE)].
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ying, inspection or removal of documents located in the territory of
the enacting state in compliance with orders of foreign authorities." 27
Given these differences between various foreign judicial systems,
"[flew issues have engendered more friction in the international legal
community than the extension of the United States legal system
beyond its borders during pretrial discovery." ' 2 This international
tension heightens the need for American courts to give due deference
to the Hague Evidence Convention. Applying the Federal Rules to
extraterritorial evidence requests means extending American judicial
authority beyond the borders of the United States, without respect
for foreign sovereignty interests, and disregards the roles of judges
and other officials in civil law countries.
IV. LOWER COURT DEcISIoNs AT AMERIcAN COMmON LAW
Generally, state courts within the United States have held that the
Hague Evidence Convention ,procedures do not preempt all other
means of obtaining evidence from abroad.2 9 A majority of federal
district courts addressing the issue of obtaining evidence from abroad
have held the Hague Evidence Convention to be only one way of
securing extraterritorial evidence. 0 State and federal district courts,
however, generally have upheld the "first resort" doctrine,31 ruling
that litigants must enlist the treaty's procedures before turning to the
.Federal Rules discovery methods.
In contrast, recent Circuit Courts of Appeal decisions consistently
have held that the Hague Evidence Convention procedures must be
subordinated to those of the Federal Rules in actions brought in this
country,32 reasoning that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
27. REsTATmENT (REvisED) § 437 reporter's note 4; see id. § 436 (foreign compulsion
defense).
28. Comment, Extraterritorial Discovery Under the Hague Evidence Convention, 31
VnLNOVA L. REV. 253 (1986). See also RESTATEMENT (REVsED) § 437 reporter's note 1.
29. See, e.g., Pierburg & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 244, 186
Cal. Rptr. 876, 880 (1982); Volkswagenwer.k Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal.
App. 3d 840, 859, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874, 885-86 (1981); Vincent v. Ateliers de la Motobecane,
S.A., 475 A.2d 686, 690, 193 N.J. Super. 716, 723 (1984); Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik
v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492, 497, 506 (W.Va. 1985) (Hague Evidence Convention not exclusive,
but first resort must be made to those procedures, in furtherance of international comity
principles).
30. See, e.g., Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.
Pa. 1983); But c.f. Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(requiring litigants to utilize the Hague Evidence Convention procedures).
31. See supra, notes 29-30.
32. See infra note 64. In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir.
1985); In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985) cert granted, 107 S. Ct. 3223
(1987) (judgment vacated and case remanded to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in
light of Areospatiale).
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foreign defendants justifies the exclusive authority of the Federal
Rules, including the authority to compel discovery. 33 Thus, the stage
had been set for the Supreme Court in Aerospatiale to settle the
splits of lower court authority.
V. Tim CASE
A. Facts
The French defendants, petitioners to the Supreme Court of the
United States, are corporations owned by the Republic of France.3 4
They design, manufacture, and market aircraft.35 In the instant case,
one of defendants' planes crashed in Iowa, injuring the pilot and a
passenger. 36
B. Procedure
After the air crash, three people brought separate suits in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. 37 Plaintiffs based
their actions on product defect liability, negligence, and breach of
warranty theories.38 The parties consented to the consolidation of the
actions, which were then heard by a magistrate. 39
Without protesting the District Court's exercise of personal juris-
diction, the French corporate defendants answered the complaints. 40
They also responded to initial discovery requests made pursuant to
the Federal Rules.41 Later, however, the French defendants moved
for a protective order when the plaintiffs served a second request
for production of documents, a set of interrogatories, and requests
for, admission made pursuant to Federal Rules 34, 33, and 36,
respectively. 42
In moving for a protective order, the defendants asked the District
Court to recognize the Hague Evidence Convention provisions as the
exclusive procedure by which pretrial discovery could be conducted,
33. See supra note 32.
34. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2546.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2546 n. 4.
41. Id.
42. Id.
372
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due to the presence of the French corporations and the physical
location of the evidence in France.
In addition, defendants argued they were unable to respond to
non-treaty discovery requests, alleging to do so would subject them
to criminal peiaties under French law.43 The French blocking statute
prohibits, inter alia, any French party from disclosing commercial
documents "with a view to foreign judicial or administrative pro-
ceedings .... "44
The Magistrate denied the defeddants' motion on the ground that
allowing the Hague Evidence Convention to supersede the Federal
Rules would "frustrate the courts' interests" in enforcing American
discovery rules. 45. According to the Magistrate, granting a motion for
a protective order would interfere with protecting United States
citizens who suffer injury from harmful products. 6 The Magistrate
noted that the strong United States interest in protecting its citizens
outweighed any "burden" placed on a foreign corporation which
might be required to produce documents. 47
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied the defendants'
petition for a writ of mandamus on the ground that the U;S. District
Court's personal jurisdiction foreclosed the possibility of requiring
the Hague Evidence Convention procedures to govern the pretrial
discovery. 48 The Eighth Circuit court held that personal jurisdiction
conferred upon the court the authority to require the litigants to
pursue discovery through the Federal Rules only, despite the evidence
requested being physically within the foreign signatory nation's ter-
ritory.49
C. The Supreme Court's Holdings
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, 50 and
in a five-to-four decision held that the Hague Evidence Convention
43. But see, Batista, supra note 26, at 66-67 (the legislative history of this "blocking
statute," indicates the French legislature never intended actually to impose criminal sanctions).
44. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2546 n. 6. But see id. at 2556 a. 29 (the blocking
statute does not change the Court's ruling).
45. Id. at 2547.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2542. The Court heard oral arguments on January 14, 1987 and announced its
decision on June 15, 1987. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, with Rehnquist,
C.J. and Justices White, Powell, and Scalia joining. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate
opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and
O'Connor (the separate opinion is cited as the dissent, and Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
Marshall, and O'Connor are cited as the dissenters).
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does apply to requests for information from foreign corporate parties
in litigation.51 The Court, however, ruled the Hague Evidence Con-
vention does not provide exclusive or mandatory procedures by which
evidence located within the territory of foreign signatory nations may
be obtained.52 Further, the Court held that litigants need not even
make "first resort" to the Hague Evidence Convention procedures
before enlisting those authorized by the Federal Rules. 3 Finally, the
Court found the Hague Evidence Convention does not deprive a
district court from exercising its authority over foreign defendants to
produce evidence physically located within the foreign party's na-
tion.5 4 The Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit's decision and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opin-
ion.55
VI. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HAGUE EVEDENCE CONVENTION
GovERNs ExTRAT RxRu OiAL DISCOVERY: TE COURT'S FOUR
OPTIONS
The Supreme Court noted in Aerospatiale that at least four possible
interpretations could be made in determining -the interaction between
the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules. 56 The majority
broke down the four options into two groups. The first group
presumes the Hague Evidence Convention by its own terms governs
extraterritorial discovery, 57 without considering foreign sovereignty
interests. At one extreme, the text of the treaty could be interpreted
so as to supersede all other methods of discovery requests. 58 At a
lesser extreme, the treaty's language could be interpreted to require
litigants make first use of the Hague Evidence Convention59 before
utilizing the Federal Rules on discovery.
The second couplet of possible interpretations considers principles
of international comity6 as a guide to judicial enforcement of the
51. Id. at 2554.
52. Id. at 2550.
53. Id. at 2552.
54. Id. at 2554.
55. Id. at 2557.
56. Id. at 2550.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. "Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895), cited with approval in Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2555 n.27.
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Hague Evidence Convention's procedures. 6 International comity then
dictates "first resort" be made to the Hague Evidence Convention
procedures in all cases (despite the provisions being strictly optional
pursuant to the terms of the treaty). Lastly, the treaty could be
viewed as an undertaking among sovereigns to facilitate discovery,
thus protecting litigants' interests in fully preparing cases. As such,
an American court should resort to the Hague Evidence Convention
when the court deems that course of action to be the most just, after
considering the situations of the parties as well as the interests of
the concerrned foreign state.62 The majority in Aerospatiale adopted
this case-by-case approach option.
Discussing all foir interpretations of the relationship between the
Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules, the Court con-
ceded that the Convention, even by the treaty's own provisions, must
at least apply to the taking of evidence abroad. The majority over-
ruled the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on this point and stated
"the Hague Evidence Convention does 'apply' to the production of
evidence in a litigant's possession in the sense that it is one method
of seeking evidence that a court may elect to employ" 63 in cases
involving evidence located abroad.
A. Textual Arguments
With respect to the two options based on textual interpretations,
the Court examined the specific wording of the Hague Evidence
Convention.
1. Hague Evidence Convention as providing the exclusive means
for obtaining extraterritorial evidence.
In a recent case similar to Aerospatiale, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in In Re Anschuetz reasoned that any intention by the treaty
drafters to establish the Hague Evidence Convention procedures as
the exclusive means of discovery would have been explicitly stated in
the treaty's language.64 The Supreme Court majority adopted the
61. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2550.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2554.
64. Id. at 2553, (citing In Re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 612 (5th Cir. 1985)
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987) (judgment vacated and case remanded to the Fifth Circuit
for further consideration in light of Aerospaiale)); see also REsrATEmENT (REmSED) § 473
comment b.
375
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Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis and dismissed petitioners'
argument in Aerospatiale that plaintiffs must pursue discovery through
the Hague Evidence Convention procedures to the exclusion of the
Federal Rules.65 Instead, the Supreme Court found that the permissive
rather than mandatory language in the text of the treaty demonstrated
the Hague Evidence Convention was intended to provide optional
procedures to be used only under certain circumstances." The ma-
jority stressed the permissive language of Articles 2367 and 27.68
Additionally, the majority found the Hague Evidence Convention
Preamble's permissive language "particularly significant in light of
the same body's use of mandatory language in the Preamble to the
Hague Service Convention. ' 69 The Service Convention 7° predates,
and serves as a model for,71 the Evidence Convention; therefore, the
Court reasoned, the Evidence Convention drafters could have fol-
lowed the Service Convention's "shall apply" language if they so
intended:2
The dissent agreed with the majority opinion in two respects. 73
One, the dissenters found the majority to be correct in rejecting the
Hague Evidence Convention as the exclusive means of procuring
evidence from abroad. Two, the dissenters agreed that the treaty at
least applies to most discovery requests. 74
Ioterpretation of a multilateral treaty lies at the heart of Aeros-
patiale. Interestingly, however, the Court did not refer to the Vienna
65. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2553.
66. See id. at 2552-53.
67. "A contracting state may ... declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued
for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law
countries." Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 2, art. 23 (emphasis added).
68. The provisions of the present Convention shall not prevent a Contracting State
from-
(a) declaring that Letters of Request may be transmitted to its judicial authorities
through [other] channels;
(b) permitting, by internal law or practice, any act provided for in this Convention
to be performed on less restrictive conditions;
(c) permitting, by internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence other than
those provided for in this Convention.
Id. art. 27 (emphasis added).
69. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2550 n.15.
70. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extraterritorial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163
(codified as FED. R. Cirv. P. 4(1)).
71. Amram, U.S. Ratification, supra note 6, at 104.
72. Id.
73. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2558.
74. Id.
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Convention on the Law of Treaties. 75 During 1969, the delegates to
the Vienna Convention unanimously voted to adopt the proposed
articles relating to treaty interpretation.7 6 These Vienna Convention
articles -establish a hierarchy of considerations to be taken into
account in interpreting treaties, 77 and lend support to the Court's
primary focus on treaty text. According to the Vienna Convention,
tribunals interpreting treaties must give foremost deference to the
ordinary meaning of the terms of the agreement.78 Only after looking
to the text of a treaty can interpretations take into account the
parties' subsequent agreements, application practices, anid any rele-
vant rules of international law.79
Legal Counsel for the British- Foreign and Cofimonwealth Office
has noted the unanimous vote to adopt the textual approach to treaty
interpretation "represents a clear affirmation by the international
community that, for purposes of treaty interpretation, prime emphasis
must be placed on the text of the treaty as representing the authentic
expression of the will of the parties."8 0 Yet,. to wholly accept the
British officer's view of the Vienna Convention's terms as the deter-
minative rules regarding, treaty interpretation merely continues a
merry-go-round analysis. By what standards does a court interpret
the Vienna Convention on treaties? By that treaty's own terms?
Nonetheless, both the Vienna Convention and the Supreme Court ixi
Aerospatiale recognized the text. of a treaty must not be taken as'the
sole consideration in determining the extent to which a treaty governs
international affairs. Thus, the Supreme Court's focus on the lan-
guage of the text of the Hague Evidence Convention in Aerospatiale
generally accords with one aspect.of the Vienna Convention. .
Nonetheless, in Factor v. Laubenheimer, the Supreme Court earlier
noted that "in resolving doubts [as to .the meaning of a treaty] the
75. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
39/27, AT 289.(1969), reprinted in 8 INT'L. LnGA MATERIAS 679 (1969), and in HEN=,
BASic Doctrumsm SUPPLEIAENT To INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASEsAND MA.TERIAs 264 (1980)
[hereinafter The Vienna Convention]. The U.S. joined as the forty-second signatory to the
Vienna Convention on April 24, 1974. 9 INT'L LEGAL. MArA's 654 (1970).
76. Sinclair, Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, 19 ITr'L & Comnp. L.Q. 47, 48
(1970). The Vienna Convention has been described as expressing "in written form the main
body of international law relating to.treaties." Id. at 65. Part III of the Vienna Convention
pertains to the observation, application and interpretation of treaties. The Vienna Convention,
supra note 75,.arts. 26-38.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. -Sinclair, supra note 76, at 61.
80. Id. at 65.
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construction of a treaty by the political department, while not con-
clusive upon courts called upon to construe it, is nevertheless of
weight." 8' Thus, the Court in Aerospatiale could have cited its own
precedent to support its current approach to treaty interpretation,
but the Court did not do so.
While foreseeing that the Hague Evidence Convention would make
radical changes in civil law countries, the United States delegate
Philip Amram hoped these changes would move the civil law countries
closer to resembling "our generous system of judicial assistance...
[and would be] a great boon to United States courts and litigants. '8 2
He also declared, "[a]ny changes in the details of internal United
States practice will be minimal, while the assistance to United States
courts and litigants in other nations will be enlarged. 8 3
In Aerospatiale, the Court acknowledged the view propounded by
the United States delegation that the Hague Evidence Convention
sought "to establish a system for obtaining evidence abroad that
would be 'tolerable' to the state executing the request and would
produce evidence 'utilizable' in the requesting state. '8 4 In addition,
according to the State Department, the Hague Evidence Convention
"provides a set of minimum standards with which contracting states
agree to comply. ' 8 5 Yet, neither the Aerospatiale opinion nor the
Hague Evidence Convention reports indicate the degree to which the
United States government's interpretation accurately reflects a con-
sensus view of the intent among the signatory states. The Aerospatiale
opinion failed to respect what the delegations from other countries
intended the treaty to be. As parties to the agreement, the signatories
and their intent prove relevant to the interpretation analysis as a
fundamental element of contract law.
The Aerospatiale Court had notice of competing concerns among
the signatories regarding their intent in adopting the Hague Evidence
Convention. Four of the nine amicus curiae briefs in Aerospatiale
were filed by governments of signatory nations. Three of these
countries, France, Germany, and Switzerland, expressed the view that
the Hague Evidence Convention was designed to be the exclusive
81. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933).
82. Amram, The Proposed Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A. J.
651, 652 (1969).
83. rd. at 652 n. 8.
84. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2549 (citing Amram, Explanatory Report on the
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, S. ExEc.
REP. No. 92-95, reprinted in 12 Il4T'L LEGAL MArERI 327, 327 (1973).
85. Letter of Submittal, supra note 6, at 324.
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means by which signatory nationals could obtain extraterritorial
evidence. 6 The United Kingdom argued that the Hague Evidence
Convention only required "first resort" to its provisions. 7 Despite
signatory views to the contrary, the Court persisted in placing primary
emphasis on the literal language of the Hague Evidence Convention,
buttressed only by considerations of the United States government's
intent. By ignoring the intent of the other parties to the Hague
Evidence Convention, the Court violated a fundamental principle of
international contract law, 8 while treating lightly the sovereignty
interests of the signatory countries.
Although briefly acknowledging the general international law prin-
ciple that a treaty's history, including negotiations, and final adopted
construction may be relevant to treaty interpretation,8 9 the majority'
did not analyze Aerospatiale pursuant to these generally accepted
rules. With its analysis of the treaty's text, the majority again also
disregarded Supreme Court precedent. 90 The Aerospatiale majority
offered little explanation for discounting non-textual considerations
in interpreting the treaty.
2. Hague Evidence Convention as requiring first, but not
exclusive, use of its procedures.
The majority opinion in Aerospatiale left unclear its reasons for
rejecting the position that the Hague Evidence Conventi6n, by the
treaty's terms, requires that at least "first resort" be made to the
document's procedures. Departing from its four-interpretation anal-
ysis, the majority simply voiced disagreement with the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals' ground for rejecting petitioners' "first resort"
argument. 91 Convinced that American courts ordering discovery which
86. See Brief for the Republic of France as amicus curiae, Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542
(1987) (No. 85-1695) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Brief file); Brief for the Federal Republic of
Germany as amicus curiae, Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2542 (No. 85-1695) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Brief file); Brief for the Government of Switzerland as amicus curiae, Aerospatiale,
supra note 1, at 2542 (No. 85-1695) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Brief file).
87. See Brief for the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland as amicus curiae, Aerospatiale, supra note 2542 (No. 85-1695) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Brief file).
88. According to the long-standing rule of pacta sunt servanda, agreements of parties to
a contract must be observed. HENm;, INTmwAToNAL. LAW: CAms AND MxrA s 4 (1980
[hereinafter HNmN]). See also The Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 26.
89. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2550.
90. See Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1934) (noting that "IWihen the
meaning of a treaty is not clear, recourse may be had to the negotiations, preparatory works,
and diplomatic correspondence of the contracting parties to establish its meaning.").
91. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2554.
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a foreign court had refused to produce under the treaty provisions
would greatly violate the foreign tribunal's sovereignty, the Court of
Appeals refused to require litigants to employ first the Hague Evi-
dence Convention procedures 2 Providing little explanation for its
conclusion, the Supreme Court majority expressed confidence that
foreign tribunals will recognize that the final -decisions, regarding
evidence to be used in American court cases, must be made by
American courts.9 Just as summarily, the majority ruled concern
over the potential need to order the production of evidence from
abroad should not affect American court's decisions. 94
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, did briefly address the
second text-based argument initially listed but not discussed by the
majority. According to the dissent, litigants should utilize the Hague
Evidence Convention as a favored method. Although the dissenters
stopped short of adopting a per se rule of "first resort," 95 they
would require a trial court to refrain from requiring the use of the
treaty's procedures only when no evidence located in a foreign
country would be produced. 96 The dissenters maintained the treaty
provisions themselves in most cases serve to resolve conflicts between
the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules. 97 Thus,
reasoned the minority, American courts usually need not resort at
all to comity principles. 98 Moreover, the dissenters observed that had
the parties to the Hague Evidence Convention expected the treaty
would not be utilized as the normal means of requesting extraterri-
torial evidence, the signatories would have had no incentive to ratify
it.99 Although neither the dissenters nor the majority acknowledged
the Vienna Convention, that treaty clearly recognized this expectation
of parties to an international agreement.'00
B. International Comity Concerns
1. International comity principles as requiring automatic "'first
resort" to the Hague Evidence Convention.
Principles of international law regarding treaty interpretation not-
withstanding, the majority also rejected, on comity grounds, peti-
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2555.
95. Id. at 2568.
96. Id. at 2567.
97. Id. at 2559.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See The Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 26.
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tioners' argument that the Court uphold an automatic "first resort"
rule in extraterritorial discovery request cases. Citing Federal Rule 1,
which mandates procedures be- enforced to ensure inter alia the speedy
resolution of legal disputes, the Court declared requiring first use of
the Hague Evidence Convention's letter of request procedures would
be "unduly time consuming and expensive."' 01 The dissent, however,
rejected the majority's.assumption as being mere speculation unsup-
ported by the record.'2 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun wrote: "Un-
less the costs become prohibitive, saving time and money is not such
a high priority in discovery that some additional burden cannot be
tolerated in the interest of international goodwill. Certainly discovery
controlled by litigants under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
not known for placing a high premium on either speed or cost-
effectiveness."' 0 3 The dissent, however, did not provide examples of
what would constitute "prohibitive" costs, nor did-it elucidate what
recourse may be taken against a party attempting to make cost-
prohibitive discovery requests.
Despite declaring a comity analysis unnecessary absent a conflict
of laws left unresolved by the terms- of the treaty,'04 the dissenting
opinion discussed at length the importance of honoring the sover-
eignty interests of signatory countries. 08 Requiring use of the Hague
Evidence Convention provisions serves to uphold these sovereignty
interests, according to the dissent, because. the signatory nations'
ratification of the treaty signifies their consent to be governed by it.
Moreover, Justice Blackmun wrote: "The [Hague Evidence] Con-
vention serves the long-term interests of the United States in helping
to further and to maintaihi the climate of'cooperation and goodwill
necessary to the functioning of the international legal and commercial
systems."'16 According to the dissent, use of the Hague Evidence
Convention meets the United States interest in providing litigants
with effective procedures by which to obtain extraterritorial evi-
dence,107 while at the same time respects the differences between
common law and civil law-style discovery methods.108 More broadly,
the dissent maintained enforcement of the use of the Hague Evidence
Convention procedures "will avoid foreign perceptions" of unfairness
101. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2555.
102." Id. at 2565.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2562.
105. Id. at 2562-64.
106. Id. at 2559.
107. Id. at 2564.
108. Id. at 2563-64.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 1
that result when United States courts show insensitivity to the interests
safeguarded by foreign legal regimes."' 9
Nowhere in Aerospatiale did the Supreme Court consider its hold-
ing in an earlier case, that "[c]onsiderations which should govern
the diplomatic relations between nations, and the good faith of
treaties, as well, require that their obligations should be liberally
construed so as to effect the apparent intention of the parties to
secure equality and reciprocity between them.""10 International law
imposes, on parties to international agreements, a positive duty of
good faith, regardless of the exact language of the text."1 The United
Nations has declared every nation "has a duty to fulfil in good faith
its obligations under international agreements valid under the gen-
erally recognized principles and rules of international law."" 2 Simi-
larly, the American Law Institute has stated "[a]n international
agreement is binding in accordance with its terms and each party has
a duty to give them effect . . .. "I" The Vienna Convention also
expressly recognized a duty of good faith to be exercised in upholding
international agreements." 4 The Supreme Court in Aerospatiale sim-
ply failed to honor these fundamental and widely respected principles
of international law.
2. International comity principles as requiring 'first resort" to
the Hague Evidence Convention only in certain
circumstances.
In declining the petitioners' "proposed general rule" that "first
resort" must always .be made to the Hague Evidence Convention
procedures, the Supreme Court, however, did recognize notions of
international comity require in each case, "a more particularized
109. Id. at 2568.
110. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933).
111. HENHIN, supra note 88, at 615 (quoting the International Law Commission 1966
commentary stating that "good faith" is an integral component of the pacta sunt servanda
rule.); see id. at 4 (discussion of pacta sunt servanda rule); The Vienna Convention, supra
note 75, art. 26.
112. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States With the Charter of the United Nations (Resolution 2625 (XXV),
adopted on October 24, 1970), reprinted in 9 ITr'iL LEm4x MATmuLs 1292, 1297 (1970).
113. RESTATE ENT OF FoamGN R.ArioNs LAW Op TnE UNIm STATES SEcoNs § 138 (1965).
"If an orderly system of international legal relations is going to be effective it must have as
a postulate that the parties to an international agreement commit themselves in good faith to
carry out its terms. This has been recoinized from the beginning of the development of
interhational law." Id. comment a.
114. See The Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 26.
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analysis of the interests of the foreign nation and the requesting
nation.""15 Surely, to proceed otherwise would render the treaty
practically meaningless. For guidance, the majority relied on the
Restatement on Foreign Relations Law. According to the majority,
although the Restatement "may.not represent a consensus of inter-
national views," it nonetheless provides in Section 437 relevant
criteria by which to analyze comity considerations." 6 Yet, the Court
never directly matched its analysis against the very criteria it cited
from the Restatement.
Section 437, with regard to cbnflicts of jurisdiction, serves to
illustrate the general "reasonableness" principle adopted by the Re-
statement in sections 402 and 403.1 7 The reporters for the Restate-
ment noted,
[the degree of friction created by discovery requests ... and the
differing perceptions of the acceptability of American-style discovery
under national and international law, suggest some efforts to mod-'
erate the application abroad of U.S. procedural techniques, consis-
tent with the overall principle of reasonableness in the exercise of
jurisdiction.""
Thus, the five criteria of Section 437 cited by the Court" 9 should
not necessarily be considered without regard for other Restatement
sections.
In addition to the criteria given in Section 437, the Restatement
also includes among the considerations to be weighed in the "rea-
sonableness" balancing process:
- the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by the regulation" in question;
- the importance of regulation to the international political, legal
or economic system; (...) and
115. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2555.
116. Id.
117. REsTATEmNT oF FoREBIN RELATIONS LAw oF THE UNITED STATEs (REvisED) § 403
comment h (Tent. Draft. No. 6, 1985).
118. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2556 n.29 (citing REsTATmmNT (REvism) § 437 reporter's
note 5) (emphasis added).
119. (1) the importance to the ... litigation of the documents or other information
requested;
(2) the degree of specificity of the request;
(3) whether the information originated in the United States;
(4) the availability of the alternative means of securing the information; and
(5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine impor-
tant interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the state where the information is located.
Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2556 (quoting REsTATEmENT (REmED) § 437).
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- the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other [international]
states. 20
Illustrations of Restatement "reasonableness" include those pertaining
to the jurisdiction to tax and the jurisdiction to apply antitrust laws.
"[Flor instance, a tax on a nonresident alien only temporarily present
within a state, measured by his world-wide income, would -be a
violation of international law.1121 Similarly, in the antitrust context,
effect on United States commerce, demonstrated by "participation
in an activity or agreement by U.S. nationals or corporations" goes
toward a showing of reasonableness in exercising jurisdiction. 2 2
Having acknowledged the Restatement Section 437 factors, the
Court in Aerospatiale failed to analyze the case with any direct
comparison of the Aerospatiale facts and these or any other Restate-
ment factors pertaining to reasonableness. The Court concluded that
deciding whether resort must be made to the Hague Evidence Con-
vention remains "a matter of" prior scrutiny [by the trial court] in
each case of the particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood
that resort to those procedures will be effective."' ' The Court's list
of factors, albeit not discordant with those enumerated in the Re-
statement, remain considerably more general. With this case-by-case
standard, the majority offered little enlightenment as to whether the
Court intended to adopt or reconstrue the Restatement principles.
According to the dissent, when a treaty has been negotiated to
accommodate the differences between legal systems, the comity anal-
ysis set forth in the Restatement, merely adds an unnecessary layer
of analysis.' 24 Even if a lower court is to be guided by the Restatement
in applying the majority's case-by-case analysis, the opinion does not
explain to what extent the comity factors apply. As the dissent
asserted, the majority's opinion failed to direct lower courts in this
regard.'21 The majority opinion thus leaves lower court judges with
rather unbridled discretion in extraterritorial discovery cases.
The majority concluded that "[s]ome discovery procedures are
much more 'intrusive' than others". 126 Yet, the opinion rather con-
120. REsTAThmENT oF FOnmoN RELATIONS LAW oF =m UNIMnD STA'rTs (REviSED) § 403(2)(d),
(e), (, (hi) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
121. Id. § 411 comment c at 215.
122. Id. § 415 comment a at 247.
123. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2556.
124. Id. at 2562.
125. Id. at 2558.
126. Id. at 2556.
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fused the intrusiveness of procedures with the intrusiveness of the
particular requests made pursuant to" the- procedures (be these pro-
cedures those of the Federal Rules or of the Hague Evidence Con-
vention). The majority suggested a discovery request for production
of all design specifications, drawings, and engineering plans concern-
ing defendants' aircraft parts would be unreasonable in scope.' z2 The
Court, however, intimated that a request for responses to "simple"
interrogatories or requests for admissions would not be impermissibly
intrusive.'2-The illustrations given by the Court thus appear to go
to the reasonableness of the extensiveness of the request, not of the
procedures by which the requests are made. The amount of eviden-
tiary information which, a litigant attempts to retrieve by way of
discovery requests differs from the means by which the requesting
party seeks that evidence. -Moreover, the majority left unresolved
whether the Hague Evidence Convention procedures or the Federal
Rules best protect litigants from unreasonable requests, however
defined. The Court merely concluded: -
The exact line between reasonableness and unreasonableness in each
case must be drawn by.the trial court, based on its knowledge of
the case and of the claims and interests of the parties and the
governments whose statutes and policies they invoke.'2
A trial court's job will include exercising "special vigilance" in
protecting foreign litigants from unnecessary, overly burdensome, or
invidiously motivated discovery requests.130 As an example of a
potential means of abusive extraterritorial discovery, the majority
referred to the additional monetary costs attendant to transporting
witnesses or documents as a possible source of abusive extraterritorial
discovery requests.' Again, however,, this goes to the scope of the
request more than to the means by which litigants make the request.
More importantly, these types of considerations practically mirror
those stated in Federal Rule 26(b)(1). 1" 2 To suggest that the very
limits on scope of discovery contained within the Federal Rules are
to :dIirect a "trial court's analysis, threatens to render the Hague
Evidence Cornvention simply meaningless.
127. Id. at 2558.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2557.
131. Id.
132. A court may limit discovery which is unreasonably cumulative, inconvenient, burden-
some, or expensive to produce. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
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In adopting this case-by-case approach with regard to such discov-
ery processes, the majority noted: "[We] do not articulate specific
rules to guide this delicate task of adjudication. 133 Recognizing the
task as "delicate," however, does little to resolve the issue of the
tension between the two competing sets of procedures.
In viewing the Hague Evidence Convention as representing the
result of effort by the United States executive and legislative branches
to advance international cooperation among sovereigns, the dissent
asserted that the adopted treaty stands in the United States as "a
political determination-one that, consistent with the [constitutional]
principle of separation of powers, courts should not attempt to second
guess.' 134 Furthermore, even assuming the majority's case-by-case
test passes constitutional muster, the dissent expressed the view that
the Court placed undeserved trust in courts' abilities to weigh properly
the competing interests at stake in international litigation. Claiming
courts suffer from a "pro-forum bias,' 1 35 the dissent found trial
court judges to be "ill equipped to assume the role of balancing the
interests of foreign nations with that of their own.' 1 36
Concerned with ensuring the preservation of sovereignty interests,
the dissenters apparently feared the potentially excessive exercise of
American judicial supervision of discovery requests in international
lawsuits. Justice Blackmun expressed hope "that courts faced with
discovery requests for materials in foreign countries will avoid the
parochial views that too often have characterized the decisions to
date.' 37 Unfortunately, particularly in light of the opiftion having
ignored the Vienna Convention, the Supreme Court's endorsement
of a case-by-case standard in Aerospatiale perpetuated rather than
rejected these parochial views.
VII. IMPACT ON AMERICAN STATE COURT CASES
The majority directed its case-by-case standard to "American
Courts" generally. 38 Yet, the plaintiffs in Aerospatiale brought their
actions in a U.S. federal district court. Hence, the Court faced the
task of reconciling the Hague Evidence Convention with the Federal
133. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2557.
134. Id. at 2560.
135. See id. at 2560 n.4.
136. Id. at 2560.
137. Id. at 2568.
138. Id. at 2557.
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Rules. Technically, any other discussion would be dictum. The ques-
tion therefore remains as to what extent the Aerospatiale decision
will influence state courts in the determination of the applicability
of the Hague Evidence Convention procedures. The United States
Constitution expressly puts international treaties on equal footing
with federal laws. 3 9 Treaties are "the Supreme law of the land."140
State statutes and state court decisions do not enjoy this status.' 41
"States do not make treaties and cannot by legislative act interfere
with the proper observation of treaties nor destroy rights created
thereby."1 42 It would thus appear any state rules of procedure would
be superceded by the Hague Evidence Convention to the extent of
any conflict.
Thus, even a state which has adopted the federal rules verbatim
may find itself without authority to impose its procedural rules in
lieu of the Hague Evidence Convention provisions. This situation
leaves an anomalous result in states which adopt the Federal Rtles
as their own rules of procedure. Aerospatiale did not address this
possibility; nonetheless, this potentiality leaves plaintiffs with a pre-
carious choice. A plaintiff seeking evidence from a party located
abroad may have a better chance of succeeding in using the Federal
Rules rather than the Hague Evidence Convention as the discovery
means, if the action has been brought in a federal district court.
Plaintiffs in state court actions run the risk of being forced to utilize
the less familiar Hague Evidence Convention procedures. Time will
tell whether the Aerospatiale decision will result in increased filings
of extraterritorial actions in federal rather than state courts.
CONCLUSION
In Aerospatiale, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected
an interpretation recognizing the Hague Evidence Convention to be
the exclusive authority governing extraterritorial discovery requests.
The Court also declined to require litigants always make "first resort"
to the Hague Evidence Convention procedures. In so holding, the
Court has departed from the view of most state courts and federal
district courts in the United States. The Supreme Court adopted a
139. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
140. Id.
141. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat. 1) (1824).
142. Clark v. Pigeon River Improvement Slide & Boom Co., 52 F.2d 550, 556 (8th Cir.
1931).
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case-by-case "reasonableness" test to restrict the applicability of the
Hague Evidence Convention. The Aerospatiale opinion has directed
trial courts to limit applicability of the treaty to those instances when
the judges find the Hague Evidence Convention would be more
effective than the Federal Rules in securing evidence from abroad.
Concededly, the drafters of the Hague Evidence Convention did
not unanimously agree that the treaty should preclude all other
discovery rules. 43 By failing to state the treaty in express, mandatory
terms, the drafters left room for judicial interpretation which may
not coincide with the signatories' intentions. Evidenced by the treaty's
preamble, the delegates to the Hague Evidence Convention aimed to
prescribe procedures which would facilitate obtaining evidence located
in foreign countries for use in litigation in the United States.'4
With Aerospatiale, the Supreme Court has not entirely precluded
use of the Hague Evidence Convention, nor has the Court completely
disregarded notions of iiternational comity. The Court instead has
attempted to strike a balance between a litigant's interest in obtaining
evidence located in a foreign country, and the sovereignty interests
of signatory nations.
To say the Hague Evidence Convention procedures "apply" to
cases in which a United States court has personal jurisdiction, how-
ever, does little to assist American practitioners in determining to
what extent the treaty provisions govern extraterritorial discovery
requests. The Court's case-by-case test only provides some broad
general guidelines, and the opinion offers but a few illustrations of
reasonable and unreasonable discovery attempts.
The case-by-case standard grants lower court judges the discretion
to invoke the Hague Evidence Convention provisions only to the
extent they mirror those of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Supreme Court's grant of substantial discretion thus leaves open
the potential of the Hague Evidence Convention being rendered
completely superfluous in cases brought in American courts. The
United States, as a signatory nation to the treaty, should not disregard
the Hague Evidence Convention provisions, because to do so greatly
increases the risk of an already prevalent friction between the United
States and other signatories. Aerospatiale to some degree at least has
settled the controversy as to the current American judicial view. Yet,
the Supreme Court's adoption of a case-by-case standard necessitates
143. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
144. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 2.
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further common law developliieht to provide litigants who bring
actions in American courts vith d clearer conception of which set of
discovery procedures to utilize fil obtaining evidence from abroad.
Lori A. Noonan

